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The Debate Between Liberalism and
Neo-Leftism at the Turn of the
Century
Chen Lichuan
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Nick Oates
1 From the beginning of the 1980s to the middle of the 1990s, three movements took
centre stage on the Chinese intellectual scene: radicalism, conservatism and liberalism.
This article sets out to retrace the debate between liberalism and neo-leftism by relying
exclusively  on the  polemical  texts  of  the  Chinese  writers1.  How can we present  an
intellectual debate that is a process of questioning and clarification and that does not
arrive at a consensual conclusion? How can we render intelligible the concepts debated
in extracts from the original texts? How can we evaluate the impact that this debate
has had on a society undergoing a profound transformation? These are just some of the
difficulties with which we were confronted. We begin by providing a brief review of
how the debate between liberalism and neo-leftism came into being, before comparing,
on the basis of some major currents of thought, the writings of the authors who have
taken part in the debate. Finally, we explore some tracks of evolution, in particular
with  regard  to  a  new  rift  surrounding  the  question  of  civil  liberties  and  political
democracy.
The rediscovery of liberalism
2 The debate between radicalism and conservatism can be traced back to the beginning
of the twentieth century, a time when occidentalists and traditionalists raged a furious
dispute. On the cultural level, they clashed in their attitudes to the values of traditional
Chinese culture: the former envisaged a scenario of the tabula rasa in which new ideas
imported from the West, such as liberty, democracy and progress, would triumph; the
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latter  held  onto  the  old  values  as  a  system  of  immutable  references  that  it  was
necessary to maintain in order to preserve China’s cultural identity. On the political
level, one side demanded a fundamental change, even if it was to cause a revolution;
the other side advocated reform of the current order. In reality, their positions were
more complex: cultural radicalism did not necessarily lead to political radicalism, nor
cultural  conservatism  to  political  conservatism.  Hu  Shih,  the  pioneer  of  Chinese
liberalism and indisputable leader of cultural radicalism, was relatively moderate in his
political views. Sun Yat-sen, determined revolutionary and committed republican, had
a high regard for the ancient political philosophy. Certain men of letters and of politics
who were for a time considered radical were later labelled conservatives: Kang Youwei,
leader  of  the  Hundred  Days’  Reform,  switched  to  the  conservative  ranks  after  the
Republican revolution of 1911;  Yan Fu, precursor of Chinese liberalism, finished his
career, in the eyes of some, as a defender of Confucian order; and Chen Duxiu, partisan
of “total Westernisation” during the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and chairman of
the Communist Party following its creation in 1921, became a “man of backward ideas”
in the view of intellectuals on the left.
3 For some intellectuals, as Chinese history of the twentieth century oscillated between
radicalism and conservatism, what China has lacked is not the impetus to overturn the
system  in  place  by  force,  nor  a  conservative  tradition  addicted  to  the  past  and
advocating  the  maintenance  of  the  old  order,  but  a  liberalism based  on  pluralism,
democracy and the rule of law. Confident in the establishment of this fact, liberalism
has, in the course of the twenty-five years of the opening-up of the economy and of
social  change,  experienced  an  indisputable  renewal.  Referring  to  Karl  Popper’s
criticism  of  scientific  analysis,  Xu  Jilin2 asserts,  for  example,  that  throughout  the
twentieth century in China,  the intellectual world and socio-political  practices gave
priority to utopian undertakings for social change (utopian social engineering) in a step-
by-step process (piecemeal social engineering)3. To a certain degree, the debate between
radicalism and conservatism paved the way for a rediscovery of liberalism, a current of
thought of Western origin, the implantation of which in China has long been suffocated
by a tradition too firmly anchored in collectivism.
4 The  other  distinctive  trait  of  liberalism  is  its  role  as  spiritual  heir  to  the  New
Enlightenment movement, which embodied in the 1980s the new modern culture in the
face of socialist tradition and Maoist dogma. There were a great many intellectuals who
came together  at  that  time under  the flag  of  the New Enlightenment  to  break the
ideological taboos. In the early stages, numerous intellectuals—the well known and the
less well known—took this side in the debate that set radicalism against conservatism,
whether in mainland China or overseas. Among them were Yu Yingshi4, Jiang Yihua5,
Wang Yuanhua6 and Li Zehou7. In the fashion of the latter two, some intellectuals who
took  part  in  the  New  Enlightenment  movement  in  the  1980s  have  revisited  their
position and converted to cultural conservatism since 19898.
5 Indeed,  following  the  tragedy of  1989,  several  factors  have  emerged to  modify  the
positions adopted—on both sides of the debate—on the model of development and the
question of  reform. These factors have included the difficulties  of  the transition in
Eastern Europe, the implementation of the market economy in China and the strong
economic growth that has accompanied it.  In this new context,  the liberals wish to
continue the unfulfilled task of the New Enlightenment by expanding the battle into
the terrain of the rights of the individual,  while several currents of thought march
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under  the  banner  of  “neo-conservatism”:  neo-Confucianism  which,  relying  on the
model  of  East  Asia  (Singapore  in  particular),  preaches  a  return  to  the  system  of
traditional values; a strengthened statism that devotes itself to the primordial task of
maintaining order and stability; and finally, a nationalism that, nourished by frictions
with Western countries  and inflamed more by an identity  crisis  than any patriotic
fervour,  tilts  at  the United States  as  an imaginary enemy.  For Yang Chunshi9,  neo-
conservatism reveals two major weaknesses of contemporary Chinese intellectuals. The
first is their immutable attachment to tradition, to which they return to to take refuge
in  as  soon as  their  struggle—none the  less  fierce—against  this  very  same tradition
meets with failure. The second is their inveterate dependence on the political system:
as soon as they lose its support, they recant and sink into bitter defeatism10.
The emergence of neo-leftism
6 In  1991,  Wang  Shaoguang11 published  an  article  entitled  “Founding  a  powerful
democratic  country”12,  a  text  that  marked  the  emergence  of  neo-leftism  on  the
intellectual scene. Examining the role of the state in the transitional phase towards the
market economy, the author demands that this economy be subject to regulation by the
state and society. Moreover, he criticises the laissez-faire approach of liberalism and
attempts to shatter the myth of the market, as he insists on the necessity of promoting
political and economic democracy in order to better lead the reform. But we have to
wait  until  1994 to see the term “neo-leftism” appear in the Peking and Hong Kong
press.  Its  first  accepted  meaning  describes  a  group  of  young  intellectuals  whose
discourse, largely inspired by the Western human sciences, differentiates itself from
that of Marxism-Leninism.
7 Neo-leftism enters the second phase of its offensive with the publication in 1997 of an
article by Wang Hui13: “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity”
14. Examining the direction taken by Chinese modernity, the author seeks to describe
the  situation  in  China  on  the  chequerboard  of  global  capitalism.  If  the  neo-
conservatives insist  on the question of  the rhythm of  reform, advocating moderate
progressivism over radical change, it appears that the neo-leftists, for their part, are
more preoccupied with the question of the direction in which the reforms are heading.
As a result,  a lively intellectual  debate pits neo-leftism against liberalism. Although
neither side constitutes a coherent and homogenous school of thought, they are clearly
distinguished from each other by their philosophical, economic and social visions.
8 Zhu Xueqin15 puts forward a definition of what he understands by liberalism: “It is first
of  all  a  theory,  then  a  realist  claim.  Its  philosophical  conception  is  empiricism  as
opposed  to  apriorism;  its  historical  conception,  contrary  to  any  kind  of  historical
determinism,  originates  from  the  evolutionist  theory  likely  to  eliminate  errors;  its
reformist  vision  is  dependent  on  a  moderate  progressivism  that  prefers  gradual
expansion and evolution to the artificial construction of radicalism. At the economic
level, it calls for the market economy over the planned economy; at the political level,
it  calls  for  representative  and constitutional  democracy  and the  rule  of  law,  while
opposing  the  dictatorship  of  a  single  person  or  of  a  minority  just  as  much as  the
dictatorship of the masses exercised in the name of the general will; at the ethical level,
it calls for the guarantee of the irreducible value of the individual, which cannot be
sacrificed, in contrast to other reducible values, as an instrument for whatever abstract
goals it may be”16.
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9 If the liberals show no hesitation in describing themselves as such, the majority of the
authors of neo-leftism have never explicitly accepted this label that has been stuck on
them by reference to the old orthodox left of the Communist Party. Wang Hui talks of a
“set of critical thought” that is occupied with “revealing the relationship between the
political  and  the  economic”17.  In  1999,  Gan  Yang18 suggested  naming  the  two
antagonistic  currents  of  thought,  both  resulting  from  the  division  of  the  Chinese
intelligentsia  of  the  1990s,  “the  liberal  left”  and  “the  liberal  right”,  or  even  “neo-
leftism” and “neo-rightism”. By reference to the United States of America of today, he
comes to the judgement that “the liberal left” is identified more with the liberals, “the
liberal right” is more closely related to the conservatives. This is just to say that Gan
Yang does not let the Chinese liberals monopolise the definition of liberalism. He seeks
to establish a blood bond between neo-leftism in China and liberalism in the West,
while deducing from this fact that the debate between liberal left and liberal right is
being  played  out  within  the  framework  of  the  debate  between  liberalism  and
conservatism taking place in the contemporary West19.  This analysis by Gan Yang is
disputed by Ren Ze20. who demonstrates point by point, author by author, that the ideas
of  neo-leftism do  not  correspond to  the  American “New Deal  Liberalism” of  James
Tobin and Kenneth Arrow21. For his part, Qin Hui22, one of the privileged targets of neo-
leftism,  positions  himself  on  the  common  ground  shared by  liberalism  and  social
democracy23.  Against  this  background,  he  recalls  that  even  the  members  of  the
Conservative  Party  in  Great  Britain  pass  severe  judgement  on  Chinese  policy  with
regard to workers who have been laid off; and that it is not only members of the Labour
Party but also conservatives who find it hard to imagine how little social protection
Chinese peasants enjoy. In reality, there is nothing paradoxical about resorting to the
theory of  social  democracy to criticise the ultra-liberals  and in using the theory of
liberalism to criticise the ultra-leftists24.
Divergence: the essential points
10 The  first  juncture  at  which  liberalism  and  neo-leftism  diverge  concerns  individual
liberty. Of all the priorities, this is considered by the liberals as core. As a consequence,
the protection of the right to own private property is a primordial condition both for
guaranteeing  individual  liberty  as  well  as  for  furnishing  a  legal  framework  that  is
indispensable for the development of the market economy25.  It was the liberals who
proposed  adding  to  the  Chinese  constitution  the  clause  invoking  private  property
rights, an amendment finally adopted in March 2004 during the tenth plenary session
of  the  National  People’s  Congress.  If  the  neo-leftists  did  not  explicitly  oppose  the
insertion  of  a  clause  relating  to  the  protection  of  private  property  rights  in  the
Constitution, they have expressed their suspicions about the goal behind this step. On
this subject, Wang Hui writes: “Nowadays, hopes are placed on the legitimisation of
private property rights as a way to resolve social conflicts. However, if the process of
privatisation is not democratic and equitable, this process of legitimisation only serves
to protect the process of illegal distribution”26. Wang Hui has no difficulty in justifying
his remark on the strength of certain consequences of the reform, including abuses of
power that have allowed certain individuals to unduly appropriate social assets.
11 The  other  fundamental  divergence  that  sets  the  liberals  and  the  neo-leftists  in
opposition to each other concerns their analyses of Chinese society today. For the neo-
leftists,  this  is  already  a  market  society  integrated  with  transnational  capitalism:
“Every day, the market economy becomes more and more the principal form of the
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economy.  The  economic  reform  of  socialism  has  led  China  to  production  relations
within  the  framework  of  global  capitalism.  In  conformity  with  the  process  of
capitalisation,  the  State  and its  function have been significantly,  if  not  completely,
changed”27.  Still  according  to  Wang  Hui,  the  New  Enlightenment  “was  not  able  to
understand  in  any  depth  that  China’s  problems  are  at  the  same  time  part  of  the
problems  of  the  global  capitalist  market.  Consequently,  China’s  problems  must  be
diagnosed  at  the  same  time  as  the  problems  of  capitalism  as  it  marches  towards
globalisation”28.
12 Xu  Youyu29,  one  of  the  liberals’  star  performers,  refutes  the  approach  of  the  neo-
leftists, which, according to him, commits an error of judgement: “The diagnosis and
the critical judgments that the neo-leftists and the Western neo-Marxists have come to
concerning contemporary capitalism can only be applied to China if one considers the
nature of  Chinese society to be capitalist”.  Now “we think that Chinese society has
undergone great changes, but the nature of that society and its political system are
direct descendants of the society and the system that was founded in 1949 and that has
passed through the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s without revolution or rupture, nor
qualitative change”30. Nor does Qin Hui accept that neo-leftism should confuse Chinese
society with Western society; the latter suffers perhaps from an excess of laissez-faire
and the welfare state, but China, in contrast, requires more laissez-faire and more of
the welfare state31. Is China today a market society? The responses to this question that
are given by liberals and the neo-leftists are certainly different, but all agree on the
teratological dimension of Chinese society, the avatar of both a very irregular market
economy and a political authoritarianism still capable of doing harm.
13 The third divergence, which holds a very important place in the debate, has to do with
social justice. On this terrain, the neo-leftists present themselves as defenders of the
victims of the growth in inequality, of widespread corruption, savage redundancies, in
short, all the evils let out of the Pandora’s box that is the market economy. Liu Qing32
sees  fit  to  remark  that  “when  neo-leftism  criticises  the  model  of  development
supported by the Chinese liberals, it never mentions the demand of the market vis-à-vis
the political system. The current debate is far too content to examine social justice
from the viewpoint of the economy, of capital and of the market, while disregarding
the  role  of  the  political  structure  and  the  intervention  of  the  citizens  in  political
matters, in particular through their participation in the system of the distribution of
social assets. If one wishes to criticise the model of liberalism, one has at least to be
aware  that  political  liberalism  cannot  be  disassociated  from  this  model”33.  For  Xu
Youyu, the liberals are the first to demand social justice. The complexity of the problem
relates rather to the fact that power lies at the origin of corruption, but the struggle
against it cannot be fought without the co-operation of that power. In the long term,
the real remedy consists in creating a market economy where there is fair competition,
in guaranteeing the freedom of the press so that public opinion can exercise a checks-
and-balances role with regard to power34. Ji Weidong35 underlines the fact that in China,
the political  system is  characterised by an omnipotent power in collusion with the
forces of money; in such a configuration, reinforcing the power of the state can only
aggravate social injustice. It is necessary first of all to change the nature of that power
before implementing economic democracy with the aid of a strengthened power36. Zhu
Xueqin, for his part, distinguishes what one can and what one cannot ascribe to the
market economy: as the market is subject to the goodwill of the regime, the sins of the
market  economy,  whether  they  be  social  injustice  or  collusion between power  and
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international capital, are committed more by “the brutal foot” (manheng de jiao) of the
regime than by “the dirty hands” (angzang de shou)  of the market. “The visible foot
walks over the invisible hand”, this is the Chinese reality37. Zhu reproaches the neo-
leftists for unrelentingly attacking “the invisible hand” of the market economy without
paying the slightest attention to the “visible foot” under which it is being trampled38.
14 The fourth divergence concerns the role that the construction of a market economy
may  play  in  the  process  of  political  democratisation.  The  liberals  consider  that
although the market economy does not necessarily lead to democracy, it remains no
less a necessary condition for that;  in the history of  the modern world there is  no
example  of  a  stable  democracy  that  does  not  have  a  market  economy39.  This  idea
implies a certain hope that we will see the advent of a democratic regime in China as
the result of a liberal economy. Li Shenzhi, leader of the liberal intellectuals in spite of
himself, has placed his hope in “the normative economy leading to normative politics”
40.  Wang  Hui  replies  that  it  would  be  utopian  to  believe  that  equality,  justice  and
democracy,  both  in  China  and  abroad,  will  be  automatically  established  via  the
market41. Han Yuhai42, another figure emblematic of neo-leftism, adopts an even more
virulent  tone:  “On  the  path  to  slavery,  the  liberalisation  of  capital  reinforces  the
privileges  of  the class  that  is  already privileged,  allowing slavery to grow,  and not
democracy”43. One might say that this divergence is born above all from the fact that
China’s  economic  modernisation,  desired  by  the  liberals  but  contested  by  the  neo-
leftists, has not been assimilated culturally or politically, but has simply been accepted,
even  demanded,  by  the  Communist  Party  as  a  necessary  means  for  the  economic
development of the country and the maintenance of its hold on power.
15 Beyond their disagreements, do liberalism and neo-leftism represent two sides of the
same coin? In both camps, certain polemicists attempt to summarise the essence of
their divergences in a spirit of reconciliation. Gan Yang considers that “the liberal left”
places the emphasis on democracy and equality, while “the liberal right” insists on the
primacy of  liberty44.  But  for  neo-leftism,  the question is  above all  one of  economic
equality, that is egalitarianism, and not of the equality of everyone before the law, as
Chen Yan rightly highlights in his remarkable work, L’Eveil de la Chine: “The principal
authors  of  neo-leftism  aim  more  at  equality  in  the  distribution  of  assets  than  at
equality in law. They show themselves to be more vigilant about the inequalities in
income than about the equality of opportunities or the equality of the conditions of
which Tocqueville talked”45. Han Yuhai recognises that the liberals primarily care about
the  equity  of  the  distribution  of  assets,  convinced  that  the  free  and  transparent
competition of the market is the only path possible for guaranteeing equity, while the
neo-leftists worry above all about the inequitable result of the redistribution of those
assets,  rising  up  against  the  concentration  of  wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  minority,
persuaded that democracy and justice should not be reduced to the free competition of
the market46. For Zhu Xueqin, neo-leftism primarily denounces the mechanisms of the
market economy, while liberalism demands above all reform of the political system47.
Ren Ze proposes drawing a demarcation line between “economic liberalism” and plain
old  liberalism,  for  certain  extreme expressions  of  economic  liberalism,  such as  the
corruption that has its reasons and its benefits,  do not conform with the theory of
liberalism48.  Xiao  Gongqin49,  for  his  part,  distinguishes  the  post-modern  and  social
democratic neo-leftists from the populist neo-leftists. The former, mindful of the social
policy  to  be  conducted,  represent  a  moderate  and  constructive  force,  the  latter,
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crystallising an anti-Western nationalism and revolutionary Jacobinism, are radical and
dangerous50.
Can Chinese modernity detach itself from capitalism?
16 With the concept of modernity having been forged in and tested against the historical
trajectory of the West, the process of modernisation is frequently identified with the
advent of the capitalist system. Can China, in the course of its modernisation, avoid the
setbacks that  Western capitalism has encountered in the historical  trajectory of  its
development? This is a question that preoccupies the neo-leftists. Their ambition is to
conceive a Chinese modernity that is distinct from the Western capitalist model.
17 In the 1980s, the New Enlightenment movement considered socialism as a practice that
ran contrary to modernity. Even at the heart of the Communist Party, certain high-
ranking  officials,  prisoners  of  its  ideological  straitjacket  nonetheless,  tried  to
rehabilitate modern capitalism. Xu Jiatun51 was a notable case in point with his famous
article entitled “Rediscovering capitalism, reconstructing socialism”52. The liberals of
the 1990s were convinced that liberalism was the only path that Chinese modernity
could take. Ren Jiantao53 lists three positive contributions of liberalism: its mode of the
effective  accumulation  of  social  assets,  through  which  it  can  contribute  to  the
economic construction of China and enable the question of poverty to be resolved; its
mode of political organisation, through which liberalism can help China liberate itself
from a totalitarian and authoritarian system; and finally, as a mode of tolerant thought,
liberalism can facilitate the blossoming of a rich and diverse scientific and intellectual
life54.
18 Ji Weidong, for his part, makes a plea to implement the choice of the liberal system by
posing three questions from a comparative point of view: is the liberal system better or
worse than other political systems? Is the fundamental problem in China the excess of
liberalism and pluralism or the lack of restrictions placed on the power of the state and
the predominance of collectivism that leads to the pushing back of individuality and
desiccates public life at its source? Can the liberal system moderate or deal with its
internal contradictions?55.
19 As for neo-leftism, it does not condemn en bloc the practices of Maoist socialism, but
tries to justify them by underlying its modernity. Thus Wang Hui explains: “Chinese
Marxism is  itself  an ideology of  modernisation.  Not  only  does  the Chinese socialist
movement hold modernisation to be the fundamental objective, but it embodies the
principal  characteristic  of  Chinese  modernisation”.  Or  even:  “The socialism of  Mao
Zedong is presented on the one hand as an ideology of modernisation, on the other as a
criticism of the capitalist modernisation of Europe and the United States… The socialist
thought of Mao Zedong is to some extent a theory of modernity set against capitalist
modernisation”56.
20 Another way of thinking that is very much in vogue at the moment is described by Xu
Youyu as  combinative:  it  is  economically  liberal,  culturally  conservative,  politically
nationalist and statist. In practice, that leads to the consideration of corruption as the
oil  that  greases  the  market  economy,  to  the  re-evaluation  of  Confucian
authoritarianism and to the support of the powers that be by cultivating nationalist
sentiments. Xu Youyu calls for vigilance if this should be the path that China takes57.
21 After the fashion of Confucius, who preached the taking of the middle road in a world
inclined to dualism, Xu Jilin, Zhang Rulun58 or even Luo Gang59 launch an appeal for the
search for a third way. Xu Jilin praises both the conviction of the liberals who believe in
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the universality of human rights and the moral courage of the neo-leftists who defend
social justice. But he reproaches the liberals for forgetting the Chinese context in order
to promote privatisation and property rights (which comes down, on the theoretical
level,  to  accepting  the  whitewashing  of  money for  those  who hold  a  monopoly  on
power and appropriate for themselves the assets of the state). At the same time, he
accuses the neo-leftists of wishing for the direct democracy of the masses in order to
find a remedy for social injustice, which seems to him simplistic and dangerous as a
method. According to Xu, it is not possible to envisage the large-scale participation of
the masses without inviting the risk of a populist outburst, as happened during the
French  Revolution,  the  Russian  Revolution  and  the  Cultural  Revolution  in  China60.
Taking the example set by Anthony Giddens, the author of The Third Way – The Renewal
of Social Democracy, Xu Jilin uses it to develop between liberalism and neo-leftism an
intermediate force focusing equal attention on liberty and social justice61.
22 Zhang  Rulun,  referring  to  the  social  democracy  that  was  advocated  by  Zhang
Dongsun62, Zhang Junmai63 and Chu Anping64 in the 1930s, calls for us to follow “this
third  path”  between  capitalism  and  socialism:  “Political  democracy  and  economic
democracy must work as a pair, like the two wheels of a cart and the two wings of a
bird.  Without  economic  democracy,  political  democracy  will  lose  its  fundamental
meaning; without political democracy, economic democracy could not be guaranteed”
65.
23 The notion of the third way also lends itself to other interpretations. For Qin Hui, if a
third way does exist for China, it will  not be found either outside of liberalism and
social democracy, nor between the two, but will have to be constructed on the common
ground that they share. “The current problem in China is neither equality shackled by
too much liberty, nor liberty shackled by too much equality. From this fact, we can only
search for the third way that ends in both more liberty and more equality”. What China
needs  therefore,  emphasises  Qin  Hui,  is  more  laissez-faire  and  more  welfare  state,
exactly the opposite of “the third way” of Anthony Giddens and of Tony Blair66.
24 Tao Dongfeng67 comes up with yet another conception for the third way. Starting from
the assertion that conservatism and radicalism are defined in China not solely by their
attitude  towards  Chinese  culture,  but  also  their  attitude  towards  Western  culture
(Chinese  culture  as  substance,  Western  culture  as  an  attribute  or  even  total
Westernisation), he accuses cultural conservatives of being essentially nationalist while
reproaching the radical liberals for disregarding the plurality of liberalism. He finds it
regrettable  that  the  strong  tension  between  conservatism  and  liberalism  traversed
twentieth century China without engendering a conservative liberalism in the mould of
an Edmund Burke in England, an Alexis de Tocqueville in France or a Friedrich Von
Hayek  in  the  United  States.  This  conservative  liberalism  that  he  prays  for  is
distinguished from Chinese  conservatism on the  one  hand in  so  far  as  it  does  not
defend the tradition of despotism and considers individual liberty as the highest of all
goals,  and  is  differentiated  from  radical  liberalism  on  the  other  hand  through  its
opposition to the revolution against tradition, for, in a country like China, it is almost
impossible  to  re-establish  authority  once  the  traditional  authority  has  been
destroyed68.
By way of conclusion
25 If ideological and social crises do not immediately give rise to a new political thought,
they do not fail to leave a mark on the spirits that live through them and to reveal the
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difficulties with which society is confronted. In fact, the debate between liberalism and
neo-leftism is being played out against the background of strong economic growth, the
collusion between power and the forces of money, widespread corruption, burgeoning
disparities between a majority of poor and a minority of rich, and the contradiction
between a poorly regulated market economy and a still-dictatorial  political  system.
Once more,  the  smell  of  burned bridges  can be  distinguished,  a  problem recurrent
throughout the history of modern China. For some, even if they do not admit it openly,
while Western society has passed from despotism to democracy, then from democracy
to a society of consumption and leisure, China could well dispense with the democratic
stage and propel itself directly into a society of consumption and leisure. They harbour
strong doubts that political liberalism is the only path that Chinese modernity has to
take.
26 What is the impact of this debate that pits liberalism against neo-leftism? How is it
perceived by the leadership of the Communist Party? Yuan Weishi69,  quoted by Mao
Shoulong, describes it as a “storm in a teacup”. He considers that the polemicists of
both sides, or a majority of them, are researchers or university lecturers who have no
ties with either official power or the forces of international politics70.  Xiao Gongqin
asserts that the debate between liberals and neo-leftists is limited to Internet sites or to
some intellectual works and periodicals with a small circulation. The exchanges rarely
take place face to face. There is little awareness of it among the public. The degree of
influence of these intellectuals is much less than that enjoyed by their counterparts in
the middle of the 1980s71.
27 If the debate pitting liberalism against neo-leftism is playing out within a restricted
circle  that  is  too  marginal  to  exert  a  genuine  influence  over  the  short-term
developments, one cannot for all that underestimate its repercussions in the medium
and long term. This debate is first of all making a contribution to the consolidation of a
pluralist  intellectual  life.  The  maintenance  of  order  and  stability  that  is  judged
necessary for the deepening of the reforms by the liberals corresponds just as much to
the  interests  of  the  pragmatic  elite  in  power  as  to  those  of  private  sector
entrepreneurs. The demands of the liberals for a better guarantee of private property
rights,  free and equal competition and respect for human rights perfectly fulfil  the
expectations  of  the  nascent  middle  class,  while  the  insistence  of  neo-leftism  on
economic democracy and social justice to the benefit of the most powerless is far from
useless if drifts in perspective are to be avoided.
28 Hu Jintao, President of the Republic and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party, declared during a press conference at the end of the APEC meeting in Bangkok
on October  21st  2003:  “The policy  of  reform and of  opening-up has  engendered in
twenty years the phenomenon of the fracture (WW, fenhua) between rich and poor. It is
impossible  that  each  reform  and  opening-up  measure  should  be  profitable
simultaneously for one billion three hundred million Chinese. Some will profit more,
and  others  less.  But  the  objective  that  the  Chinese  government  has  set  for  the
modernisation process  is  to  permit  people to  get  rich together.  The government is
determined, as it takes strong measures, to help the poor to lift themselves up, all the
while  allowing  a  part  of  the  population  to  outpace  the  others  on  the  road  to
enrichment”72. If the discourse cannot itself perform miracles, it at least translates the
care of the Chinese government to maintain a balance between a liberal economy and
social justice. As for the thorny problem of political reform, if Western democracy is
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practically excluded, an institutional reform that consists in expanding the scope of
political  intervention of the citizens is  not impossible,  and this is  perhaps what Hu
Jintao means by the expression “the necessity of enriching the forms of democracy”.
29 In  this  context,  the  liberals  and  neo-leftists  compel  recognition  as  two  influential
pressure  groups.  The  situation  seems  to  be  evolving  towards  a  kind  of  tripartite
interaction, and it is possible to interpret in this way the establishment in September
2003 of the Innovation Research Centre of the Chinese government73 attached to Peking
University. Its mission, according to its director Yu Keping, is to institutionalise the
exchanges  and  the  co-operation  between  university  researchers  and  government
officials, to survey and evaluate the experiences of the reforms that have been acquired
in all ranks of the government, in order to encourage and disseminate them. The final
objective  is  to  contribute  to  the  promotion of  the  reform of  the  political  system74.
Taking  into  account  the  constraints  of  the  reality  (the  absence  of  any  genuine
opposition parties, of a free media, of an independent judiciary, etc.), this process is not
uninteresting, although it forms part of the tradition of royal advisors who cultivate
collusion with power. What appears strange is that this research centre has been placed
in a university, in this case Peking University, which has as its vocation, in theory at
least, the conduct of free research into the truth, and not the provision of advice to
whatever government it may be.
30 It has to be admitted that in China at the moment, two profiles of intellectuals can be
drawn, those who wish to play a genuine role in the conception of  a  free and just
society―they can be found just as much in the camp of the liberals as in that of the
neo-leftists―and those who, for one reason or another, play a part in reinforcing the
power in place. The former, currently called “public intellectuals” (WWWWW, gonggong
zhishifenzi),  frequently  assert  themselves  in  the  defence  of  the  civil  rights  of  a
population that has been misled; the latter, rarely engaged in intellectual debates or
public  affairs,  are  for  the  most  part  identified  with  the  pragmatic  elite  within  the
system. In the absence of any political pluralism, “the public intellectuals” are called
upon to  play  the  role  of  an  opposition75.  Under  the  single  party  dictatorship,  “the
pragmatic elite” is inclined more to institutional reform, conscious that an institution,
however effective it may be in its structure, cannot function forever if it is deprived of
democratic legitimacy.
31 The  distinction  between  these  two  types  of  intellectuals  relates  perhaps  to  their
response  to  a  crucial  question:  how  can  China  escape  its  ancestral  logic—“he  who
conquers state power by force rules”76? The first group seems to believe, consciously or
unconsciously,  in  the emergence of  a  civil  society.  Associating themselves  with the
general  population,  they  demand,  for  a  tactical  reason  no  doubt,  “liberty  before
democracy”,  using the examples of  Hong Kong and Singapore.  The second group is
convinced  that  it  is  necessary  to  wait  patiently  for  the  Communist  Party  to  be
transformed from the inside,  for  the emergence of  a  civil  society depends to  some
extent  on  the  tacit  consent  of  the  party  in  power.  The  current  situation  can  be
characterised by this double expectation, where a new scission divides the intellectual
world  around  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  society  and  politics:  the
dissociation between private and public space (in other words the distinction between
civil liberty and political liberty), or the confusion of these two spaces. On this crucial
point  in  the  process  of  the  modernisation  of  Chinese  society,  it  is  high  time  that
liberals, neo-leftists and social democrats find a consensus.
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